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BOOK REVIEWS
By Joel Francis
Mr. Justice Sutherland: A Man Against the State.
Paschal. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1951.
Pp. xii, 267. $4.00.
Charles Evans Hughes and the Supreme Court. By Samuel Hendel.
New York: King's Crown Press, Columbia University, 1951. Pp.
xii, 337. $4.50.
What was once viewed as a heterodox and somewhat profane suggestion is now recognized as a commonplace truism: that under the
guise of legal form the Supreme Court of the United States exercises
far-reaching political, social and economic control. Even under the new
dispensation, characterized by judicial self-restraint in passing upon the
validity of legislative action in the field of economic regulation, constitutionalism continues to play a dominant role in the historic processes
of government. Nor is the public any longer entirely innocent about
the functioning of the judicial process in constitutional cases. They
understand now better than ever before that "judicial decisions are not
babies brought by constitutional storks, but are borne out of the travail
of economic circumstance."' It is not surprising, therefore, that attempts to analyze and explain the judicial statesmanship of a past period
of our history by reference to the social, economic and constitutional
philosophy of its outstanding jurists not only afford peculiar fascination
to students of law and politics but hold the interest of an increasing
number of general readers. This is especially so when the subject of
a judicial biography happens to be of the intellectual calibre and attainments of the late Chief Justice Hughes or of the late Mr. Justice Sutherland.
Serving upon the Supreme Court from his appointment in 1922 by
President Harding until his retirement in 1938, shortly after the defeat
of President Roosevelt's ill-fated program for court reorganization, Justice Sutherland was the most articulate and persuasive spokesman for
the so-called "right-wing" of the Court during this fateful and turbulent
period. He was, in truth, its intellectual leader. His opinions were
forceful but judicious, hard-hitting but urbane. While most of Sutherland's convictions ran counter to the prevailing social and constitutional
thinking of the latter portion of his judicial service, it is inaccurate to
classify him as either a servitor of vested interests or a hidebound
protagonist of the status quo. During his twelve years of service as a
United States Senator from Utah, Sutherland waged a long fight for
1 LERNER, IDEAS FOR THE IcE AGE

259 (1941).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 30

improved conditions for American seamen, sought to bring about reforms in federal judicial procedure, advocated the Postal Savings Bank
Bill, and struggled unceasingly to secure an adequate Workmen's Compensation statute. Three well-known instances during Sutherland's
service on the Supreme Court will serve to illustrate his occasional
championship of innovation. His opinion in Euclid v. Ambler,2 which
sustained the constitutionality of zoning, was an enlightened discussion
of the legal justification for this form of social control of property rights
and interests. His opinion in Funk v. United Statesa which upheld
the competence of a wife to testify in behalf of her husband in a criminal
prosecution when the common-law rule was otherwise, was a notably
liberal exposition of the view that outworn rules of evidence must be
adapted and recast to serve the needs of a changing civilization. In
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation4 Sutherland succeeded in winning the approval of his colleagues for the proposition that
the power of the federal government in the field of foreign relations
does not depend for its existence on the Constitution, but is an inherent
power arising by virtue of the United States' membership in the family
of nations; its exercise is hence not subject to constitutional restraints.
All these and many other interesting matters are brought out in
Mr. Paschal's scholarly, penetrating and objective study of Justice
Sutherland's career as a politician and jurist. It is a book which should
appeal to both lawyers and laymen because of the insight it gives into
Sutherland's social, economic and legal philosophy, as exemplified by his
record in the Senate and his opinions and votes in leading constitutional
cases. Mr. Paschal sketches with admirable clarity his subject's frontier
background, his struggles for an education, the leep impression made
upon his thinking by certain of his teachers, his early and complete
acceptance of the philosophy of Herbert Spencer, his beginning ventures
into Utah politics, his short service in the House of Representatives
and his longer career in the Senate, his important role as adviser to
Warren G. Harding in the presidential campaign of 1920, and finally
his long service as a member of the high court. Against those governmental innovations and constitutional heresies which did violence to his
cherished tenets, Sutherland waged vigorous warfare. But the essential
kindliness of his personality is indicated by the fact that he did not
allow the fervor with which he maintained his convictions to dampen the
warmth of his personal relations with his associates in the political arena
or with his brethren on the bench.
Steeped in the Spencerian philosophy of individualism and laissez
faire, Sutherland found his deeply rooted beliefs rudely challenged dur2272 U. S. 365 (1926).
*290 U. S. 371 (1933).
1299 U. S. 304 (1936).
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ing virtually the entire period of his political and judicial life. Mr.
Paschal makes the point that one reason why Sutherland is important
is that his career illuminates the problem of the theorist as judge. He
shrewdly observes that
"Sutherland, whatever his knowledge of political theory, suffered
from the familiar difficulty of not knowing enough. He was a
devoted student of the philosophical intricacies of nineteenth century individualism but had little interest in other systems. His
exclusive preoccupation with but a segment of man's ideological
experience rendered his intellectually parochial. He was so immersed in the Spencerian philosophy that he had no power to
criticize it judiciously, no measuring stick with which to approach
it selectively, no vantage point from which to see how much of
Spencer was merely the expression of an age. In short, he had
not the capacity for transcending his own experience."
Professor Hendel's careful and judicious study of the judicial career
of Charles Evans Hughes is a book of a considerably different sort. It
is not a biography in the conventional sense of that term and is not intended to be. A certain amount of biographical material is necessarily
included in it but merely for the purpose of setting in its proper perspective Hughes' service on the Supreme Court, first as Associate Justice from 1910 to 1916 and finally as Chief Justice from 1930 to his
retirement in 1941, at the age of seventy-nine. Mr. Hendel's book is
limited to an analysis and evaluation of the important constitutional
issues that came before the Court during these two periods and of the
part which Hughes played in their solution. The first phase of Hughes'
judicial service coincided with a considerable part of the New Freedom
of Woodrow Wilson and preceded America's entry into the first world
war. The second coincided with the Roosevelt New Deal and preceded
America's entry into the second world war. The author rightly observes that both these periods were marked by "legislative innovations
involving great extensions of governmental power over the economy
and challenging traditional conceptions of the rights of the states and
of individuals. The latter was particularly a period of great crisis for
the nation and produced a fundamental challenge to the Court itself."
Mr. Hendel's presentation of the important constitutional cases coming before the Court during these two periods is characterized by accuracy, objectivity and readability. The facts are expertly summarized
and the issues are clearly outlined. Taken in conjunction with the
author's critical analysis of Hughes' judicial techniques and constitutional philosophy, these case discussions supply the reader with an informative survey of an important segment of the constitutional history
of the United States. The study can scarcely be called a "popular"
book to be read as a matter of general interest, but anyone who is con-
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cerned with the recurring problems incidental to America's most original
contribution to the science and art of government-the institution of
judicial review-will find it well worth reading.
Mr. Hendel wisely concludes that it is a tribute to the leadership of
Hughes during the court fight that he never permitted the sometimes
bitter differences within the Court to disrupt it. He sought above all
else to maintain the dignity and prestige of the Court. When the pressure for change in constitutional interpretation became insistent, he
reluctantly went along. "He stood thus," in the author's view, "as a
kind of heroic and, in a sense, tragic figure, torn between the old and
the new, seeking at first to stem the tide but then relentlessly caught
up and moving with it."
PENDLETON HOWARD.

Professor of Law
School of Law
University of Southern California
Los Angeles, California.
Legal Aid in the United States. By Emery A. Brownell. Rochester,
N. Y.: The Lawyers Cooperative Publishing Company, 1951. Pp.
xxiv, 333. $4.50.
Because of the extensive nature of this report on legal aid in the
United States, and the careful evaluation which is made of legal aid
services 'available today, the publication provides the framework for
observing one of the major areas in which special needs of indigent
people have not yet been fully met. Through various types of programs,
society has recognized its responsibility for persons who must have provided for them through public taxation or voluntary contributions the
essentials of &aily living. These essentials are made available not only
through welfare programs but also through provision for meeting basic
educational and recreational and health needs. The many occasions
upon which an individual needs legal consultation have not been so
generally recognized in planning for community services nor, in all too
many communities, provided for with any degree of adequancy for persons unable to pay for needed legal services. In every state it is essential that services be made available for the protection of the individual
and his family from a legal point of view. To do this humanely and
constructively is the challenge accepted by legal aid agencies.
This current publication is the third in a series of reports on the
development of legal aid in the United States. It follows "Justice and
the Poor" by Reginald Heber Smith, issued in 1919, and "Growth of
Legal Aid Work in the United States," by John S. Bradway and Reginald Heber Smith, issued as a U. S. Department of Labor Bulletin in

1952]

BOOK REVIEWS

1936. Mr. Brownell, the author of the present volume, visited all legal
aid offices in the United States and had the advice of experts in the
field in preparation of this authoritative report. The fact that legal aid
services are now being provided for more than 300,000 persons each
year indicates the major importance of this area where law and social
services meet on a common ground.
The comprehensive nature of the report is indicated by the chapter
titles as follows: "Justice and the Poor," "Legal Aid Today," "What
Legal Services Are Needed," "Who Needs Legal Aid ?" "Legal Aid for
Civil Cases," "Legal Aid for Criminal Cases," "The National Legal
Aid Association," "Service Now Available," "Who Renders the Service?" "Who Bears the Cost?" "Next Steps." Legal aid is defined as
"the organized effort of the bar and the community to provide the services of lawyers free, or for a token charge, to persons who cannot afford
to pay an attorney's fee or whose cases are unremunerative on a contingent fee basis."
Two major impressions are given by careful review of the text. One
is the fact that even the established legal aid facilities are meeting only
slightly more than half of the full need of their communities, based upon
ten people per thousand population in a community, and even so, the
existing coverage is far short of the 20 per cent of the population estimated to require legal aid service. The other striking point is that
approximately three-fourths of the problems handled require consultation service only or some referral to another service. The great volume
of the work is handled through a single visit by the individual to the
office.
The study reflects the need for increased understanding on the part
of the general public of the role of legal services in contemporary life,
services which to such a large extent are not directly connected with
courts and court action. The number of cases served in communities
which have legal aid offices indicates that there has not been sufficient
appreciation on the part of the social agencies of the ways in which
legal aid may supplement and strengthen the individual social agency's
help to the family or of the problems which can be more readily solved
through legal consultation than other types of service. Here in the
Southeast the lack of legal aid facilities is particularly striking and calls
for careful study directed toward the most effective means of providing
legal aid where needed.
This important volume clearly presents the current picture, the
needs, and the basic principles which should be followed in the establishment of legal aid facilities. The fact that such offices should be carefully
integrated into the community is stressed by the author and is certainly
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in line with the best thinking regarding other types of community facilities and services.
This study of legal aid in the United States represents a major contribution to social welfare as well as to legal practice. It should be on
the required reading list not only for lawyers and law students but also
for social workers in both public and voluntary agencies and can be read
with profit by civic leaders concerned with the development of a comprehensive pattern of community services.
ELLEN WINSTON.

Commissioner
State Board of Public Welfare
Raleigh, N. C.
Sex and the Law. Morris Ploscowe. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1951. Pp. vii, 310.
Sex and-the Law is in no sense a purely legalistic treatise. At the
same time there is a clear presentation of the laws bearing on practically
every aspect of sexual behavior shown in the institution of marriage
and in non-marital situations, including normal and legal expression of
the sex drive, as well as the various aberrant and, or, illegal expressions
of it. This, itself, is a noteworthy contribution. Over and beyond this
is an excellent appraisal of the influences of the ecclesiastical laws, the
common law, and of social concepts in the formulation of our present
laws. There is definite criticism of existing laws from the standpoints
of their fairness to defendants, their adequacy in securing socially desirable results, and the degree to which they are actually enforced with
reasons for laxity of enforcement in cases where it exists, and the lack
of uniformity of laws within the various states.
There is repeated, well-placed emphasis upon the disparity between
high ideals back of the "law's interest in the conservation of marriage
and the stability of family life," and the actual protection the family is
given by such laws, when applied, as well as the frequent laxity in their
application.
The author clearly recognizes the importance of the courts' using
every available scientific aid in the solution of the problems brought
before it. Thus in his discussion of divorce-the ease with which it
may be obtained in some jurisdictions, and, at the same time, the necessity for its availability in certain domestic situations he says: "Social
case work, probation, psychiatry, and marriage counseling may be able
to provide husbands and wives with answers to their problems which
they themselves have not been able to find. These expert services may
be able to rehabilitate marriages which appear to have broken down
completely.... In our opinion, divorces should only be granted to hus-
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bands and wives after a thoroughgoing attempt has been made by a
panel of experts to adjust the differences between them."
That the author is cognizant of the psychological implications in the
attitudes represented by the laws and their application is many times
apparent in this book. A clear cut example is found in relation to his
position that the law bearing upon the status of illegitimate children
must go further than the establishment of paternity. "It must recognize what is amply demonstrated by modern psychology that rejection
is one of the surest ways of twisting personalities and creating disturbed
individuals."
There is a similar emphasis for the need of the assistance of experts
in the careful planning of problems of correction and rehabilitation for
sex offenders. In connection with long term sentences, special stress
is placed upon the necessity of differentiation between the sex offenders
who are primarily public nuisances, such as exhibitionists, and the
smaller group who are actually dangerous, either to life and health, as
the sadists, and those who use force to secure sexual gratification and
those who are dangerous to the development of normal sex habits and
attitudes. In this latter group he places the older sex deviants who
engage in various forms of sexual activity with children.
Throughout, one is impressed by an unusual degree of objectivity
and understanding in the discussion of such problems as rape, homosexuality, sodomy, prostitution and other forms of sexual expression so
seldom approached in a non-emotional manner. One is also impressed
by the comprehensive social approach to all of these problems and the
clear cut definite suggestions for improving the laws and their administration.
This reviewer is convinced that this book is so clearly, logically,
convincingly, and authoritatively written that were it carefully read by
every literate person in this country and especially by every practicing
lawyer, every judge, and every state and federal legislator, there would
result a degree of understanding that would either demand or sanction
most, if not all, the changes suggested by the author. In addition, it
is his belief that there would result a general tendency toward a greater
degree of objectivity in attitude toward undersirable sexual behavior.
HARY W. CRANE.

Professor of Psychology and Psychological Consultant
University of North Carolina
Chapel Hill, N. C.

